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Abstract 
The paper aims at analyzing the impact of immigration of Syrian asylum seekers on the German 
energy market. Germany has been a leader of the energy transition, and has been effectively 
shaping European Union’s environmental policies. The unprecedented influx of the newcomers 
following the chancellor Merkel’s political move to open the boarders challenges feasibility of 
this project. This study evaluates the challenge from the supply and demand side of the energy 
market. It does so through the thorough examination of available data, government documents 
and literature to analyze historical developments and current implementation of the energy 
transition, together with Syrian impact on the energy market. The paper argues that although 
Syrian asylum seekers constitute only a small fraction of the whole group of incomers to 
Germany, the analysis of their impact suggests that usage of coal in the energy mix should not be 
expected to fall soon. 
Keywords: Energiewende, German energy transition, Syrian Civil War, asylum seekers, 
inequality, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Summer 2015 was a peak of a humanitarian emergency Europe has not seen in its post 
1945 history, comparable only to the Yugoslavian war.  Due to the global insecurities and power 1
struggles and political transformations in various African and Middle Eastern countries, 
unexpected number of people tried to move to Europe and as their end goal, particular countries 
in the European Union. The group of newcomers was very diversified, coming from plethora of 
countries and due to very different reasons.  Most importantly however, its scale met EU’s policy 2
makers unprepared. The crisis has challenged many of the European Union’s mechanisms, and 
policies like the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and the allocation and provision of basic social 
services to the asylum seekers, as well as border control, integration mechanisms and accuracy of 
terrorism checks. Depending on the scale and persistence of the Syrian conflict, the current 
situation will have significant implications for European society, especially given the EU’s aging 
population (but also other socio-demographic changes, such as Sweden’s changing sex ratio).  3
The crisis raises a question about the future of solidarity among European Union member states; 
 According to the OECD analysis, this crisis could be called unprecedented due to the asylum 1
seekers being very diverse in terms of country of origin, profile and motivation, and therefore 
with higher than ever pressure on asylum systems in destination countries (OECD 2015).
 It should be noted that, contrary to a popular belief represented by opinion-making medias and 2
politicians it is often impossible to distinguish the nuanced difference between economic and 
non-economic migrants as the political situation in a country significantly shapes economic 
opportunities available. 
 Cf. Kaźmierczyk 2007, The Economist 2016.3
Page  4
numerous governments strongly oppose the idea of imposing quotas for the acceptance of 
refugees in EU countries. In such a political context Germany is breaking from the norm: despite 
widespread opposition, especially after the New Year’s Eve sexual assaults in Cologne, the 
country’s doors remain open for newcomers in the name of human responsibility. Around 1.1 
million people were registered in 2015 in Germany as refugees, and political leaders reply to the 
critiques: “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do it”). 
 Apart from the concerns that first come to mind while analyzing social impact of this 
policy of acceptance like ones mentioned in the previous paragraph, current situation may 
pressure the German government to redefine its policy responses to non-obvious public sphere 
issues as well. Germany has been a leader of implementation of renewable energy resources and 
green technology, and as the main actor of EU’s political scene, has been effectively shaping the 
organization’s environmental policies. If the demand for energy were to increase to a level 
exceeding current capacities, it could have intriguing implications.  
 Depending on the new aggregate preference for and economic feasibility of green energy, 
increased demand can either act as a boost for the local green energy producers, providing them 
with a bigger market advantage and more money spent on research and development, or it can 
mean a return to conventional energy resources. It would be a particularly interesting tradeoff, 
especially when considered in light of the recent COP summit in Paris, the Europe 2020 horizon, 
and the EU’s commitment to lead the environmental battle. Moreover, a problematic relationship 
with Russia, the EU’s main energy exporter, may lead to the reevaluation of the energy union and 
cross-border energy trade ideas. 
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 The social role of Energiewende should not be undermined either. While this research 
area is yet not particularly gross, there are a few good studies that provide an interesting layer to 
the debate. Germany policies challenged the status quo in energy discussions and their ambitious 
project already acts as a source of inspiration to various social movements across the globe. In 
the time of heated debates about adequacy and effectiveness of policy responses to the global 
warming among politicians, the outcome of Germany’s experiment carries a particularly 
important weight.  4
 This paper assesses these changes. In the second section, through the analysis of available 
government documents and research literature, it tracks the evolution of German energy policies 
to provide the readers with a bigger picture of constraints on energy provision depending on its 
source. In the third section the focus is put on the demand side of energy market. Based on the 
data from the World Bank, “the Economist” database and the theoretical approaches towards 
similar conflicts, the questions on the scale and time horizon of the Syrian immigration to 
Germany are addressed. Further, the implications of the following additional usage of energy is 
estimated. The research findings are relevant to the policy making world by showing the  level of 
adaptation of demand and supply in German energy market in the current circumstances. Thanks 
to this paper, debates about energy transition feasibility, and consequences of the recent 
immigrant crisis will become more informed and planning of the future outlook of Germany 
energy market would be enriched by additional perspective.  
 Probably the most visible sign of the importance of the increased debate on ethics of 4
environmental change is the Pope Francis’ 2015 encyclical “Laudato Si” completely devoted to 
this topic. 
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(R)EVOLUTION OF SUPPLY-SIDE POLICIES 
Figure 1. Primary Energy Consumption in Germany 2015, Source: AGEB, December 2015 from: http://
www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/conventional-energy-sources,did=679724.html accessed on 7/12/2016 
 After a drop in supply in the years following the Reunification, Germany has been a true 
hegemony in terms of size of its energy market in the European Union (Renn and Marshall 
2016). However, it is not end of the story, quite the opposite - it is also one of the most rapidly 
changing. The policy climate regarding this issue is shaped not only by technocrats and the 
researchers’ findings, the market forces and investment-opportunity seeking, but also by the 
active and hearable voice of public opinion. The German Energy Transformation - Energiewende 
- is a concrete result of such a policy climate change. The most dramatic changes over the last 
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years happened to affect the nuclear and renewable pieces of the energy cake presented in the 
Figure 1. The issue of coal has also been heavily disputed, however until now, no significant 
change has occurred.  
Nuclear 
 Nuclear energy, once considered a resource of the future, alternative for coal, gas and oil, 
still plays the most important role in terms of energy generation, including France, Germany’s 
biggest neighbor. Globally, it avoids the emission of over two billion tons of carbon dioxide each 
year.  In Germany, however, it is on its way back and the speed with which it traverses this way 5
should rather be compared to the formula 1 bolide than to a gradual retreat. 
 The change in optics and as a result in policy making practice came in this case from   a 
civic movement and has a long history. First signs of the anti-nuclear sentiment were observed 
already in the late 60’s, somehow just “by the way” main protest of the 1968 generation and so-
called extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) against, among others, dominance of national 
politics by CDU party. As Hake at al. point out, also the canonic volumes of green literature of 
the 1970’s led to an increase in the level of ecological awareness.  Such awareness soon 6
reappeared in the form of both peaceful and disobedient protests against building of new plants, 
fueled by new accidents, such as Harrisburg and Three Mile Island ones. And while the policy 
 http://www.world-nuclear.org/focus/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy/nuclear-energy-and-5
climate-change.aspx
 As examples they list “Limits to Growth” and “Small is beautiful”. See Hake, Fischer, 6
Venghaus, and Weckenbrock 2015, 535.
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makers cordially were still seeing nuclear as “a quite dangerous, but absolutely necessary part of 
Germany energy supply”, the movement had wide socio-political consequences, with a major 
wing of the Germany Green Party (established in 1980) constituted of anti-nuclear activists. 
 Much has changed since 1986 after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. In terms of public 
opinion, for the first time proponents of the phase-out of nuclear energy constituted a majority.  7
As a result of this and of unfavorable economic circumstances, mainstream political consensus 
also broke up (SPD calling for phasing out), and no more new nuclear power plants were 
planned. After the integration of the West German energy system into the Neue Länder (former 
East Germany) all but one of the nuclear power plants in the latter were shut down.  
 The changes accelerated even more as the political scene changed in 1998. After the 
ruling parties lost the elections, a new coalition, the so-called “red-green”, comprising of the 
center-left SPD and the Green Party, came into power. One of the points of the coalition 
agreement was the introduction of a legal act regulating nuclear phase-out (Siefken 2007). 
 One of the most important government document of that time was “Act for the Orderly 
Termination of the Use of Nuclear Energy for the Commercial Generation of Electricity” - 
considered a success for the energy transition supporters. However, the ultimate end of nuclear 
energy was not set largely to the flexibility of the freshly developed solutions. Nonetheless, the 
diffusion of new ways of thinking was impossible to stop, especially as the 1968 generation 
played an even more important role in society.  
 Spiegel NN. Mehr SPD-Wähler durch Atom-Ausstieg? Der Spiegel, 1581986, no 351986, cited 7
in Hake at al. 2015
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 As a result, the government formed in 2005 under Chancellor Merkel of the center-right 
CDU/CSU and the center-left SPD - grand coalition - from the very beginning aimed to fulfill 
very ambitious energy sustainability goals (compare with section II b of this paper). However, a 
nuclear consensus has not been reached. 
 After new elections a so-called “non-ideological, technology-open and market-oriented 
energy policy” approach was implemented, and a glimmer of hope shined for the supporters of 
nuclear. The new government, seeing it rather as a bridging energy resource, retained the 2000 
nuclear phase-out conception, yet alternated it: it announced an extension of the previously 
defined lifetimes for NPPs to ensure security of energy supply (Energiekonzept 2010). Such 
policy, presented however as a “phase-out of nuclear phase-out” was implemented together with 
enabling a rise in the spent fuel tax that led to a great opposition, media and social discontent.  8
 Thus the public’s feverish reaction after 2011 Fukushima accident should not appear as 
too much of a surprise. In one of the German lands, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Mrs Markel’s ruling 
party lost to the Green Party.  Under such a pressure the decision had been made to close, almost 
immediately seven oldest reactors, to suspend the lifetime extension to an initial three months, 
and to conduct stress test on all the used nuclear units, so called nuclear memorandum (Dehmer 
2013). 
 Moreover a new governmental unit was appointed, the ad-hoc Ethics Commission, that 
however was not composed of experts on the energy policy and nuclear risks (Renn et al. 2016). 
Its recommendation regarding the nuclear energy was following: the phase-out within ten years, 
 Opposition even charged the government  “with compromising public safety in exchange for 8
increased revenues.” See Renn et al. 2016.
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was later passed in German Parliament.  As The German Energiewende…nicely puts it, the 9
“nuclear conflict” in Germany came to an end as all the mainstream parties and public opinion 
reached the consensus on this topic (Hake et al.2015). 
Renewables 
Figure 2. Gross electricity generation in Germany in 2015, Source: Working Group on Energy Balances, 
status: December 2015, for: http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Renewable-Energy/renewable-
energy-at-a-glance.html accessed on 7/12/2016 
 First interest in the renewable technology as a supplement to the already established 
energy sources appeared as a result of global macroeconomic events, including oil shocks and 
other countries’ research programs, and post-1968 generation demands (von Hirschhausen 2014). 
 Despite the deadline of the decommissioning given in the amendment to the German Atomic 9
Act is 2022 (Bundestag 2011). 
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In 1974, the German Ministry of Research and Technology launched its first program to support 
individual technologies, PV among others (Hake et al. 2015). Over time different subsidies and 
tax breaks were introduced; however, generally these decisions were mainly public opinion-
driven, and estimates for potential use of renewable energies were expected to reach at most 5% 
of the general electric power consumption in the year 2000. 
 With the post-1968 generation playing a more and more important role in the public 
sphere, and opting for phasing out of the nuclear, together with an increased number of 
documents reporting the deteriorating condition of the global climate, the German government 
was forced to look for alternatives. By 1998, all parties stated that a faster development of 
renewables was desirable (Hake et al. 2015, 536). Among various policies that aimed at 
integrating the renewables with the grid, the Act on the Supply of Electricity from Renewable 
Energy Sources into the Grid, or StrEG (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz), passed in 1990 was of the 
biggest importance. It required energy companies to accept and pay a minimum price for the 
third-party-generated electricity. If there is a problem with grid stability, the manager can cut off 
wind or solar parks, but operators receive compensation for that. According to the analysis of 
Hake et al., although it was not able to trigger a boom in this sector due to the linking of 
compensation rates to average electricity prices, it still laid the groundwork for the market 
integration of renewables (2015, 536). 
 In 1998 the New Coalition in its roadmap to phase out the nuclear power confirmed and 
underlined the role of the alternative energy sources:  
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The new government will ensure a future-proof, environmentally friendly and cost-effective 
energy supply. Renewable energies and energy efficiency have priority [ ... ]. The government 
believes that the entry into new energy structures will be characterized by growing economic 
dynamics, which will be further supported by redesigning the energy laws. This includes, in 
particular, non- discriminatory grid access and the creation and safeguarding of fair market 
opportunities for renewable domestic energies through a clear legal regime and a fair 
distribution of the costs of these sustainable energies (SPD, Grüne 1998). 
 A formal document that replaced StrEg in 2000 was the Act on Granting Priority to 
Renewable Energy (Renewable Energy Act, EEG). It brought fixed feed-in tariffs 
(Einspeisevergütung) decoupled from current electricity prices for the alternative energy 
producers. As a result of favorable conditions not experienced in any other country, German PV 
and wind energy markets became the largest in Europe (Barroso, Iniesta 2014). Critics worried 
about how much such a program would cost the average German tax payer, were responded by 
the Environmental Minister Jürgen Trittin from the Green Party “as much as a scoop of ice 
cream” (Würzburg, Labandeira and Linares 2013). 
 The next government - the grand coalition, during which rule the IPCC reports on global 
results of the climate change gained increased publicity, moved the debate on renewables to the 
international audience as well. In the pre-Lisbon treaty European Union, chancellor Merkel as 
the head of German delegation during the German half-year presidency managed to convince 
the EU-leaders to work out the consensus on this issue. As a result, the 20-20-20 target was set to 
be achieved by the year 2020. According to the agreement, the EU's greenhouse emissions 
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should be cut by 20 percent compared to 1990, energy efficiency should increase by 20 percent 
and the share of renewables in total energy consumption should rise to 20 percent (Rada UE 
2007).  
 However its policy measure in Germany went far beyond the 20-20-20 principles. The 
introduced Integrated Energy and Climate Program, or IKEP, expected CO2 emissions to fall to 
40 percent, and the share of renewables in electricity generation to increase to 30 percent level 
(14 percent in case of heat generation). The new measurements put a lots of weight to the energy 
efficiency principle (IEKP 2007). 
 2010, when German Energy Strategy, or Energiekonzept was introduced, brought the 
reversal in harsh course on nuclear extending the lifespan of nuclear reactors, however it did not 
harm the development of renewables.  The plan established new goals: “By 2020, the share of 10
renewables in gross energy consumption should increase to 18 percent and to 60 percent in 2050. 
By 2020, the share of renewables in gross electricity consumption should rise to 35 percent, to 50 
percent in 2030, to 65 percent in 2040 and to 80 percent in 2050” (Hake et al. 2015). 
 The third grand coalition (in power from 2013) had to reformulate its attitude towards the 
renewables as their share in the energy mix increased and challenged the assumptions behind the 
system. As argued by Hake at al., there were significant implications of the success of the 
policies that were not accounted in the planning phase but grew in importance during the process 
of implementing the EEG. First, it had to fave the problem of growing prices. Mr. Trittin’s 
 For an interesting discussion on this topic see for instance: http://polet.network/blog//germany-10
realpolitik
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predictions underestimated the real cost of the feed-in-tariff program to the society. Moreover, 
due to the increased competition, some of the conventional power plants were not able to 
economically operate any longer. Additionally, civil movements in some places, mainly Eastern 
Germany were opposing the energy transition on the local level. Further, the power grids, 
necessary to the distribution of generated power, were not expanding at the pace planned. Also 
the issue of potential electricity supply shortages due to the uncertain weather was raised by the 
opponents (CDU, CSU, SPD 2013). As a result, the government decided to reduce the 2025 and 
2035 targets (respectively to the 40-45% and 55-60% levels), lower the tariffs and slow down the 
explosion of renewable capacities (Haas, Lettner, Auer and Duic 2013) 
 The most recent adjustment to the strategy was voted by the Bundestag in 2014, setting 
so-called expansion paths for each energy source, introducing “sun tax”, and reforming subsidies 
for PV-sites and equalization schemes for the energy-intensive industries among others (Haas et 
al. 2013). The most recent renewables’ division in energy generation in Germany can be seen on 
the graph nr 2. Nonetheless, the policy instruments were seen as pioneering and exported to other 
countries wishing their share of renewables to increase.  11
 On the probe of implementation see for instance Lara-Fanego, J.A. Ruiz-Arias, D. Pozo-11
Vazquez, F.J. Santos-Alamillos, and J. Tovar-Pescador 2011, and on the very good tables 
summing up the developments of policies towards renewables see Hake et al. 2015.
Page  15
Coal 
 Coal, understood as lignite and hard coal has historically played a very important role in 
the German energy mix. Today it remains the most important source in the electricity generation, 
and according to the German government public information: “in order to continue providing a 
reliable energy supply in future, Germany will require ultra-modern and flexible coal-fired power 
plants”.  12
 German government was one of the first on the world to try to set international standards 
also in coal’s usage reduction to limit the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. In the 1990 the 
government included obligations of the commission on “Preventive Measures to Protect the 
Earth's Atmosphere” as part of its official energy and environmental platform (see the Table 1.) 
and two years later it ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (so 
called Rio Convention) with a similar focus. These steps were later on followed with the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as well. 
 http://bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Conventional-energy-sources/coal.html12
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Table 1. UNFCCC Emission reduction goals, Source: generated by P Macholak, based on Hake et al. 
2015, 538 
  
 These efforts did not stop with new governments, and it was Angela Merkel’s first 
government’s greenhouse gas emissions and coal reduction push in 2007 that allowed her to be 
known as the “climate chancellor”. During the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, she 
successfully convinced the member states to officially “seriously consider” the reduction of 
global CO2-emissions by 50 percent by 2050 (Hake et al. 2015). 
 Hard coal mining in Germany has been undergoing an intense process of restructuring 
with steady decreases not only in the support provided for hard coal mining but also in the 
number of mines and people employed in this sector. In light of this trend, about 90 per cent of 
the German market's supply of hard coal and hard coal products was imported in 2013.   13
 http://bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Conventional-energy-sources/coal.html13
2005 2050
Global emissions 5% 50%
EU emissions 20% 80%
Western 
industrialized 
countries with an 
exceptionally high 
output
30% 80%
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 Lignite with its significant reserves (the largest in the world) and relative low economic 
cost of exploration per a tonne, never needed government subsidies, and therefore the decision to 
shut the mains was more difficult to make from the economic standpoint. Because of the high 
environmental costs of lignite mining changing the landscape and habitats permanently, the big-
scale recultivation was introduced.  In terms of the official legislation, 2010 Energiekonzept 14
further framed the goals for a low-carbon German economy of tomorrow.  
Table 2. Planned reduction of the Greenhouse Gas emissions under 2010 Energiekonzept, Source: 
generated by P Macholak, based on https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/
_Anlagen/2012/02/energiekonzept-final.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 
  
 However, the Energiewende brought changes to the situation of coal. Paradoxically, with 
increased energy production coming from renewables, also the CO2 emissions increased, and the 
share of lignite did not fall (DEBRIV 2015) With energy prices dropping the CO2 intensive-
lignite mines were the only ones to keep up with competition, on the contrary to gas or even 
hard-coal fired power plants. As Renn and Marshall notice, “the more that Germany invested in 
 Since the operations began, around 176.490 hectares of land in total have been used for lignite 14
mining, approximately 69 per cent of which has already been recultivated. Around 19 per cent of 
the recultivated area has been reassigned as agricultural land, approximately 30 per cent as forest 
and woodland areas and around 13 per cent has been made into water areas (http://bmwi.de/EN/
Topics/Energy/Conventional-energy-sources/coal.html)
2020 2030 2040 2050
GHG emissions 40% 55% 70% 80%
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the Energiewende (it poured in more than 27 billion Euros in energy subsidies, financed by 
energy consumers), the more the amount of CO2 increased” (Renn et al. 2016). 
 According to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (referred to as COP) 
agreement, German government committed to phasing-out nuclear power by 2021, and to 
reducing the fossil fuel consumption to 20% of the 1990 level by 2050. It reawaken the existing 
debate of potential non-coal economy, with the promise made by the chancellor to examine the 
possibility of not using fossil fuel for electricity production after 2050. Gas, the potential 
intermediary of energy transition, proved to be too expensive when extracted with the current 
methods. Simultaneously because of the environmental costs there is a strong opposition from 
the German side not only to extract the shale gas in Germany, but also in other members of the 
European Union.  A significant shift in rhetorics was observed by the proponents of the coal 15
usage, switching the discussion point from the conflict between either coal or delegitimized 
green energy to the importance of using coal as a new intermediary in the energy transition, as 
noticed by Renn et al. “located in more distant future” (2016). It is therefore needed to provide 
enough both economic and political energy security to the German consumers.  There is a whole 16
set of interesting problems connected to this rhetorics, starting with the gap between the West 
and the East Germany, where most of the coal mines play a crucial role for the regional economy 
 For more on the debate around shale gas in Poland, Austria and Romania, see for example 15
Weijermars 2013.
 See for example the debate on Russian pipeline NordStream2 project.16
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and identity, possible technological alternatives like carbon-sequestration (CSS).  However the 17
most often raised is the issue of cost of the economic transition without coal, with current 
expenses to fill the gap between market price and the guaranteed price of renewable energy 
production are believed not to be affordable even for Germany in the long-run (Chrischilles and 
Bardt 2015). However, as proved by a great study by Hohmeyer and Bohm who did not include 
the heat transportation energy demand, a transition from the present electricity supply system to a 
100% renewable energy based system can be achieved (2015). With these precautions in mind, 
let us now move to the analysis of the demand increase.  
DEMAND CHANGE 
Why only Syrians 
 The analysis of all different groups of newcomers, including ones coming from poor, but 
peaceful countries who recently started arriving to Germany, reveals problematic trends. The 
numbers coming from particular countries are hardly foreseeable and are very dependent on 
external variables, for instance current weather conditions enabling traveling to Europe, political 
will and border control enforcement. Each of the newcomer groups experiences different 
 For the East vs West split see for example: Morton and Müller 2016, for the CSS discussion, 17
see Lechtenböhmer and Sascha Samadi 2012. 
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preferences that may make the modeling of their energy consumption behavior impossible. Thus, 
to provide a sound and meaningful analysis, the paper focuses on the group of Syrian refugees. 
They constitute the biggest group of both refugees and asylum-seekers in Germany and because 
of their shared cultural background, allow for modeling of preferences that avoids ecological 
fallacy – in other words, there is a smaller risk of them being just some type of an average of 
very variable individual preferences. 
Scale 
 Civil War in Syria started in 2011 as the government reacted to social changes called the 
Arab Spring. As a result of this uniquely brutal and bloody conflict, and emergence of new actors 
like DAESH, the humanitarian situation deteriorated. Since the beginning of the conflict around 
11 million Syrians have fled their homes—they moved either within Syria or went abroad. In 
August 2015, the German government under its chancellor, Mrs. Angela Merkel, took a bold 
decision to open its doors to newcomers fleeing from war. The government made this decision as 
a result of large numbers of victims trying to enter the promised land.  This decision made by 18
 She did so by stating the famous - wir schaffen das - we can do it, we can afford doing it., and 18
she used this phrase many times after. As a result of the political (within her own party, her 
Bavarian coalition partner and new political players like a right-wing Alternative für 
Deutschland) and loss of the public support from public (https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/sep/04/mecklenburg-vorpommern-german-anti-immigrant-party-strong-regional-election-
exit-polls-merkel) after lost regional elections for her party in Mecklemburg-Vorpommern Land, 
and just before another lost ones, this time in regional vote in Berlin, she gave an interview to the 
financial magazine Wirtschaftswoche. In the article she decided not to use the phrase anymore, 
she said “this phrase was a little overstated, that too much store was set by it — to the extent that 
I’d prefer not to repeat it. It’s become a simple slogan, an almost meaningless formula.” more on 
that: http://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-drops-the-we-can-do-it-slogan-catchphrase-
migration-refugees/.
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the German government effectively overrode the 1990 Dublin Convention that asylum seekers 
must seek asylum in the first European country they encounter.  Such decision created a serious 19
political debate in almost every circle, starting from Mrs. Merkel’s very own party, and finishing 
with populations of other European Union countries.  
 Regardless of political disputes, more than 450 000 refugees from Syria applied for 
asylum in Germany up to 2016.  Up-to-date data on asylum applicants from Syria are shown in 20
the Figure 3 below. 
"  
Figure 3. Number of first time asylum applicants by month, Source: generated by P Macholak, using the 
Eurostat data, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tps00189, accessed on 11/25/2016 
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the 
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 http://syrianrefugees.eu/timeline/ - project of scientists from the Migration Policy Centre from 19
the European University Institute in Florence.
 http://syrianrefugees.eu/asylum/20
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 Based on the data we can clearly see variations in the number of refugees. Seasonal 
factors clearly impact numbers of refugees. One thing this chart does not show however, is the 
impact of political events. This leads us to another problem to consider - how are the most recent 
political highlights going to affect long-term persistence of this migration crisis? 
Time Horizon 
 While many would argue that the unexpected refugee influx proved the European Union’s 
inability to effectively handle crisis management mechanisms.  Many efforts to mitigate this 21
situation have not only been proposed, but also implemented. Another big question is that of the 
efficiency of these methods, however that is an issue for another paper. In March 2016 Balkan 
countries decided to close their borders and hence to shut the main refugee route to Northern 
Europe. In the same month a deal between European Union and Turkey to control border traffic 
and returning refugees trapped in Greece to Turkey is agreed upon. Results? In May, Frontex, the 
European Border Control Agency, reported that number of migrants arriving to Greece dropped 
by 90% from March to April of 2016. Moreover other policies, such as those coming out of 
Brussels, sought to mitigate the crisis. In July 2016 the European Commission proposed a 
scheme including a payment of 10,000 euros per a resettled refugee to each member state 
 For example Bassam Brandi at the panel hold by the Perry World House on September, 20th 21
2016, when he stated that “Syrian refugees crisis shows limits of the current EU system, and a 
new conflict will just prove that something has been rotten, probably even since Iraq.”
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voluntarily accepting newcomers. There is also an ongoing debate regarding the reform of 
Frontex.  22
 All these policies, especially the Turkey deal have a potential to stabilize the trend 
observed in Germany of the influx of approximately 25,000 asylum applicants per month, ceteris 
paribus. The Turkish attitude towards refugees is one of the most positive, in spite of already 
absorbing more refugees than other European countries, approximately 2.7 million Syrian 
refugees. Additionally the Turkish government provides fewer economic restrictions on refugees 
when they are looking to be active members of the labor market.  23
 How long will this influx remain stable for? Or how long is the Syrian conflict going to 
last? It is never an easy task to estimate such things especially because we are not fortune tellers, 
and the complexity of this particular conflict does not help. In fact, this one conflict is comprised 
of three major sub-conflicts being fought simultaneously between the Assad’s regime and 13 
major rebel groups: the civil war, the sectarian war and the proxy war.  A good analysis of 24
available research on civil wars made by Barbara F. Walter does not prove optimistic for the 
Syrian conflict. On average, a civil war started after 1945 has lasted for about 10 years, and ones 
with a bigger number of factions tend to last longer.  25
 Cf. https://www.ft.com/content/7bd81ad4-a02b-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46 or http://22
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-reform-of-frontex-saving-schengen.html.
 Work permits application is available to big numbers of them since January 2016 - http://23
syrianrefugees.eu/timeline/.
 Depicted greatly by this the Atlantic’ graphic: https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/24
posts/2015/10/ISISWeb/572e69131.jpg.
 Cf. https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/10/18/the-four-things-we-know-about-how-25
civil-wars-end-and-what-this-tells-us-about-syria/.
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Usage of energy 
 In the table below data from the World Bank database about electric power consumption 
per capita in Syria has been presented. The values for years before the civil war were chosen on 
purpose, because the war is too much of an external effect that can distort the picture. Using 
2006 as a starting date enables us to observe values for the years before and after the recent 
economic crisis. In calculating the average consumption for the model, the values for the 2010 
was not included because it was too much of an outlier, and values for the post-2010 period were 
not included because they were influenced by the external effects of the ongoing conflict. 
Therefore the average electric power consumption per capita in Syria between the years 
2006-2009 equals to approximately 1577 kWh, which relative to the average German per capita 
consumption (both over the same period and over the whole presented time horizon: respectively 
7112 kWh and 7143 kWh) is a lot less. As a point of reference, the graph of values of the same 
index for both Syria and Germany is presented below.   
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Figure 4. Electric Power Consumption Per Capita from 2006 to 2013, Source: generated by P Macholak, 
using the World Development Indicators updated on 12/21/2016 
 While making such comparisons one has to take into account differences in energy needs 
that shape consumption. According to the data from the World Bank, Germany experiences on 
average two times lower annual temperature level than Syria. The climate difference can also be 
seen while analyzing levels of Heating Degree Days in Germany (3,252) and in Syria (1,388). 
Electric Power Consumption Per Capita 2006-2013
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And although in Syria there is intuitively more days when cooling is needed, they do not make 
up for the difference.    26
 Other factors that influence the outlook of the potential energy demand of successful 
Syrian asylum applicants living in Germany are energy costs and habits. Could the additional 
demand act as a boost for the German local green energy producers? Electricity prices are 
compared in the table below, and especially given in what type of restrained economic conditions 
asylum applicants have to exist in, even with the support of German welfare state, one can 
question if they would be able to even maintain the energy consumption they had back in Syria, 
not to mention energy consumption level close to the average German one. The resulting 
inequality level between Syrians and other inhabitants of Germany may have serious 
consequences on the effectiveness of integration policies.  
Table 3. Average price of electricity in US cents per kWh, Source: generated by P Macholak, using the 
Worldbank data: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/germany/getting-electricity/ and 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/syria/getting-electricity/ accessed on 1/2/2017 
 The comparison of the Cooling Degree Days available at wundeground.com database, 26
accessed on 27/08/2016.
Germany Syrian Arab 
Republic
Price of electricity 
(US cents per 
kWh):
26.6 11.5
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 Another question that arises is an issue of potential convergence of energy-related 
behavior. How much of the type of energy consumption comes from the availability of energy 
types, and how much is the intrinsic attitude? Comparison of the Renewable energy consumption 
(% of total final energy consumption) between 2006 and 2012 shows significantly that German 
consumers rely on the renewable energy more heavily. Does it necessarily mean the Syrian 
nationals are less environmentally-minded?  
Figure 5. Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption) from 2006 to 2012, 
Source: generated by P Macholak, using the World Development Indicators updated on 12/21/2016 
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 When we analyze the per capita CO2 emissions (Figure 6.) we also find a big disparity 
between data for Syria and Germany, however in this aspect Syrian Arab Republic citizens 
represent more pro-environmental orientation, which could suggest a lot in this matter depends 
on the type of economy and energy sources available. The question of a potential convergence of 
Syrian with asylum living in Germany in respect to their energy consumption habits should be 
raised in the public debate as well. 
Figure 6. CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita from 2006 to 2013, Source: generated by P Macholak, 
using the World Development Indicators updated on 12/21/2016 
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DISCUSSION 
 Energiewende, the project essential for many Germans and German politicians, is 
influenced by the whole lot of factors and external effects. The recent refugees crisis challenges 
it as well, providing an opportunity to evaluate current responses of the German political system 
and questions its future development. Up to now understanding what Energiewende means has 
been limited to establishing two big constraints on the energy supplies: phasing out nuclear and 
limiting the use of coal-based energy sources, while promoting expansion of the renewable 
energy. Some authors heavily criticize this way of delivering the energy transition project with 
the main arguments against it being too much of the inward-looking energy reforms without 
willingness to harmonize support schemes and energy systems working in other countries, also 
involving more coal and nuclear power, and the massive focus on just one “technology family” 
that excludes carbon capture and storage (CSS) method and fracking the shale gas, among 
others.  27
 While the Syrian asylum applicants do not constitute as much of the energy demand as 
the publicity of the refugees issue would suggest, they still enable us to draw some valuable 
conclusions. The analysis of their impact shows that while Syrians have different energy 
consumption behavior types than the Germans do, these different energy consumption behaviors 
seem to be more strongly dependent on the type of the design of the existing energy market 
rather than on some intrinsic preferences. This would suggest that there exists a potential for the 
 See for example Schmid, Knopf, and Anna Pechan 2015.27
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convergence of energy needs experienced by the Syrian refugees in Germany, however this 
convergence will be dependent on the access to the energy-efficient and renewable-based energy 
supply provided by the welfare state-like type of support.  
 Moreover, while its scale is still limited, a constant and significant flow of the Syrian 
refugees influencing the German energy needs should be expected. While the issue of inequality 
connected to German consumers has already been raised with the argument that the initially 
poorer households who cannot afford renewable infrastructure anyway, have to pay for the 
guaranteed prices for the producers of this energy type, this inequality has not been considered 
yet on the basis of the refugees/natives split.  Such inequality has also been recognized in spatial 28
terms with the nostalgia for the “golden age” of coal and connected to it opportunities has been 
widely experienced in the former German Democratic Republic what could matter even more 
depending on the long-term plans of the successful asylum applicants settlement. As pointed out 
by Hake at al.: 
 “only radical incidents or developments may lead to deviations from a pursued political 
path. With respect to the Energiewende, two conceivable developments might initiate such a 
shift: (a) the energy transition fails technologically (e.g., a sustained major blackout occurs that 
must plausibly be ascribed to the immaturity of renewables), or (b) the energy transition fails 
socio-economically (e.g., a sustained, significant increase in energy or, especially, electricity 
prices leads to considerable social unrest or endangers the economic competitiveness of the 
Germany industry)” (2015). 
 See for instance Renn et al. 2016.28
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 Thus, to avoid such a shift, current Energiewende experiences showed limited 
implementation of the coal-based energy reduction. Because of the increase in the demand on 
energy per se as a result of the incoming refugees and a need to keep the prices affordable to 
constrain “socio-economical incident” hampering German energy transition, the coal usage in the 
German energy mix should not be expected to fall. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 This analysis naturally has its limitations. Out of over a million refugees entering 
Germany in 2015, Syrians made up almost 40 % of them. Despite being the biggest group, their 
energy needs are only a fraction of the over 80-million country in the Central Europe. Moreover 
focus on the asylum seekers, while useful from the methodological point of view, reveals 
problematic questions in the world facing the biggest displaced population ever. According to the 
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) there are various types of delays with 
filling asylum application and therefore there is more people already residing in Germany than 
the asylum applicants, including undocumented migrants.  They also together with temporarily 29
provided shelters add to the demand on German energy. Moreover every conflict has its 
specificity and seems impossible for even the best study to accurately estimate the duration of 
the future ones. Syrian conflict with its whole complexity may yet turn many times and it seems 
impossible not to make any ceteris paribus assumption regarding viable for now yet questionable 
 http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/EN/2015/08/new-asylum-forecasting-29
submitted.html
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in the future maintaining current political deal with Turkey and Germany’s attitude towards 
newcomers in the light of the 2017 elections. However, as said these conditions may change and 
it will alternate the scale of the refugees influx to Germany and therefore the increase in the 
demand on the energy. 
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